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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON LEE KIESEL, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
EVELYN MARIE KIESEL, 
Defendant-
Responden t. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_) 
) 
) 
) 
) ' 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16806 
This controversy arises from the Motion made by 
defendant to modify a 1974 Divorce Decree for the purpose 
of increasing child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A hearing was held upon defendant's Motion, at which 
time The Honorable Don v. Tibbs entered an Order modifying 
the Decree by increasing child support from a total of $125 
to a total of $250. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant requests this Court to vacate any 
award of child support as to Marsha Kiesel and to modify 
the amount of child support as to Mary Kiesel. 
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. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 16, 1974, a Decree of Divorce was entered 
dissolving the marriage of the parties to this action. 
At such time it was provided that plaintiff should pay 
support to his child Marsha Kaye Kiesel in the amount of 
$75 per month and support of Mary Ann Kiesel in the amount 
of $50 per month. (R. p. 30.) In addition, other awards 
of property were made by the Court, including an award to 
defendant of the family residence. 
Subsequent to the divorce several Orders to Show Cause 
were filed by both parties. These Orders concerned various 
subjects, including the failure of defendant to enroll Marsha 
Kiesel in special training at Primary Children's Hospital. 
Defendant was held in contempt of Court for this inaction 
(R., p. 70-71). Subsequently, defendant was also held in 
contempt of Court for failing to bring the children before 
the Court for interview and for continuing to harass plain-
tiff (R., p. 88). 
On August 15, 1979, a Petition for Modification was 
filed by defendant seeking an increase in support for Marsha 
and Mary. A hearing was held on September 26, 1979, regard-
ing this request. 
The lower court found a chance of circumstances justify· 
ing an increase of child support for Mary from $50 per month 
-2-
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to $100 per month. The Court continued support for Marsha, 
even though at the time of the hearing she was over 20 years 
of age. The Court specifically found her to be a special 
child with physical and mental deficiencies requiring con-
tinued support (R., p. 113-114). 
It is from this Order of Modification that the present 
appeal is taken (R., p. 117)0 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT DID NOT 
JUSTIFY THE COURT'S MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE. 
It is fundamental that a previously entered decree 
may not be modified for the purpose of increasing support 
unless it is alleged and proved and the trial court finds 
that circumstances on which the decree was based have 
substantially changed. Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah 
1953). Each case must be determined upon the basis of the 
immediate fact situation. Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P.2d 784 
{Utah 1977)., 
This Court is authorized to make its own findings 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
when it would be fair and equitable and in the interest of 
justice. Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978) Q 
The lower court decision, however, will not be disturbed 
unless it appears that the evidence so preponderates against 
the trial court's finding that inequity or injustice results. 
Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978). 
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It is also basic law that the trial court has con-
siderable discretion in reviewing petitions for modifi-
cation. However, this discretion cannot be used to arrive 
at decisions which are not based upon competent evidence 
in the record .. 
The decision of the Court at the conclusion of the 
hearing was as follows: 
The Court finds that in 1977 Mr. Kiesel 
re~arried and that he"and his spouse 
together, as shown by Exhibit No. 3, 
had an adjusted gross income of $29,898. 
The Court finds there was a loss in 1978 
but the Court finds that a substantial 
part of that was depreciation. The 
Court finds that based upon the taxes 
of 1979, there would be in excess of 
$30,000 depreciation which would offset 
the loss that Mr. Kiesel testified to. 
The Court finds that there has been an 
increase in Mr. Kiesel's gross earnings 
to date of $10,042.95 and the Court finds 
that Mrs. Kiesel has nominal earnings, 
and the Court finds that this is a special 
child and the record is replete all the 
way through, right from the commencement 
of this divorce action, concerning the 
fact that this child would require special 
education and special care for the balance 
of her life and the Court is of the opinion 
that Mrs. Kiesel is needed in the home to 
take care of her and maintain her and do 
the best she can with her. 
The Court finds that there has been a 
change of circumstances. As to Mary, the 
support money is increased to $100 a month 
and to the minor child, Marsha, that the 
support should continue and the support 
rate is set for $150 per month. (R., p. 
186-187.) 
Several errors are apparent from the Court's stated 
opinion. First, the Court in arriving at the 1977 income 
-4-
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and in the 1978 income utilized the income figures of 
plaintiff's new wife. Exhibit 3 entered by the defendant 
shows that approximately $5,200 of the total $17,000 from 
wages was earned by plaintiff's new wife. Likewise, 
Exhibits 1 and 4 show that in 1978 plaintiff's new wife 
earned approximately $6,500 of the total $18,000 income 
from wages. 
The inclusion of plaintiff's new wife's income was 
erroneous. This Court has held on numerous occasions that 
a husband may not def end against a claim for support from 
his former wife based upon the husband's subsequent remarriage 
and undertaking of expenses. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
438 P.2d 180 (Utah 1968); Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1978}. Likewise, if a wife remarries and her new 
husband has substantial income and assets, this does not 
relieve the former husband from his obligation of child 
support. Martin v. Martin, 251 SWe2d 302 (Ky. 1952)0 
These standards are equally applicable to the instant 
case. If plaintiff cannot claim a defense because he has 
married a woman and has assumed a responsibility as to her, 
it is only just that defendant cannot claim an advantage 
gained by plaintiff marrying a woman who also brings in income 
to plaintiff's household. Because of the irrelevant nature 
of plaintiff's wife's income, no testimony was introduced 
by plaintiff as to the obligations plaintiff's new wife has 
-5-
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or the obligations which he has undertaken because of this 
marriage. It is no more relevant for plaintiff to claim 
additional expenses from his new marriage to oppose defen-
dant's Petition for Modification than it is for defendant 
to include the income of plaintiff's new wife in support of 
the Petition for Modificationo The trial court erred in 
including the new wife's income in computing a change of 
circumstances. 
Second, the Court erred in its determination that 
no real loss was suffered by the plaintiff in 1978 and 
1979. Exhibits 1 and 4 show that plaintiff's wage income 
for 1978 was approximately $12,700. This income was 
derived from his salary as Police Chief of Salina, Utah. 
In addition, however, plaintiff is engaged in a trucking 
business and has been since the time of the Divorce Decree. 
In 1978 the Gordon Kiesel Trucking Company grossed $100,295. 
(Schedule c, Exhibit 4.) At the same time, however, the 
total deductions amount to $151,666. (Schedule c, Exhibit 4.) 
The 1978 tax form showed a loss of $51,371. 
Of this loss $32,000 was depreciation. The trial 
court discounted depreciation as a viable factor to represent 
loss. While depreciation may be an artificial element as to 
real property, it is certainly a genuine loss as to personal 
property involving mechanical vehicles such as dump trucks and 
tractors. The Court should take judicial notice that these 
type of vehicles actually do lose their value each year and 
-6-
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will eventually become useless as opposed to real property, 
which gains in value each year and which does not suffer 
any loss of use. 
In any event, even if the depreciation is completely 
discounted from the loss figures, the 1978 tax return still 
shows an actual out-of-pocket loss of $20,000 from the 
trucking business. 
Mr. Kiesel explained that this loss was caused because 
of an airplane accident which resulted in an injured back. 
Because of this injury, plaintiff is now unable to make any 
long-haul drives. He has had to use his income to subsidize 
his trucking business and has had to borrow money in order 
to save it. (R., 176-177.) Plaintiff testified that for 
1979 the income of the trucking business to September of that 
year was $77,000, while his expenses were about $110,000. 
(R., 175.) This again resulted in a deficit of $30,000 in 
actual out-of-pocket expenses. 
The trial court noted there was a loss in 1978 but 
found "a substantial part of that was depreciation." As 
for 1979, the court said: "The Court finds that based 
upon the taxes of 1979, there would be in excess of $30,000 
depreciation which would offset the loss that Mr. Kiesel 
testified to." (R. 186.) These oral statements were reduced 
to written findings subsequently by the Court. (R. 113-114.) 
It is fundamental accounting that depreciation serves 
no purpose in reducing a loss. Depreciation is only good 
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for offsetting income. The Court erroneously concluded that 
since plaintiff's depreciation for 1979 would amount to the 
approximate sum of his out-of-pocket losses, that the two 
would somehow offset each other. Infact, however, deprecia-
tion only adds to the already existing loss, making a total 
loss for plaintiff in 1979 of some $60,000. 
Thus, the trucking business of plaintiff clearly 
suffered an out-of-pocket loss of some $20,000 in 1978 and 
some $30,000 in 1979. In addition, the equipment owned by 
plaintiff in actual value depreciated nearly $60,000. The 
combined out-of-pocket losses for plaintiff during the two 
years was over $50,000, and the depreciation was over $60,000. 
These figures definitely contradict the trial court's con-
clusion that no actual loss was incurred by plaintiff in 
1978 and 1979. 
In addition, the defendant failed to show any substantial 
change in income from the trucking business of plaintiff in 
the 1978-1979 years as compared with 1975. The Answers to 
Interrogatories submitted by plaintiff show, in fact, that 
in July of 1975 plaintiff had an income of $5,807 from his 
trucking business, while in January of 1978 he had only 
$1,362. (R. 100.) 
The preceding clearly shows that the trial court 
erred in including the income of plaintiff's new wife in the 
-8-
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computation of changed circumstances and also in concluding 
that no actual monetary loss had been suffered by plaintiff 
in his trucking business.. The only other income which could 
be relied upon by the trial court was that of his salaried 
job as Police Chief of Salina, Utah. Again, plaintiff •s 
Answers to Interrogatories show that in July of 1975 he was 
grossing $850 per month, in 1978 he was grossing $1,029 per 
month and in 1979 he was grossing $1,057 per month (R., P~ 
100, 173). 
These figures show that plaintiff's actual salary 
as a policeman increased $200 during the four year period, 
or only 24 percent. 
When this figure is compared with plaintiff's actual 
losses from the trucking business, it can be seen that this 
small increase was quickly absorbed by the losses sustained 
in the trucking business. But even if it were assumed that 
plaintiff increased his income, this alone would not justify 
an increase in support. This Court has stated: 
While an increase of the defendant's income 
is certainly an importa~t factor to consider, 
this proposition is also true: The fact 
that a man may so use his abilities as to 
increase his income should not necessarily 
impose a penalty upon him by automatically 
increasing his obligations under a divorce 
decree. The increase in income is only to 
be considered along with the other facts 
and circumstances concerning the needs of the 
children and the ability of the father and 
mother to provide for them. Owen v. Owen, 
579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978). 
-9-
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Of course, the buying power of plaintiff's dollar is 
no better and, in fact, is probably worse than it was in 
197~. This Court has held that while inflation is not a defense 
to a modification request, that it is fair for the request to 
be made proportional to the increased income of the father. 
Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978). In this case, 
an increase of 25 percent would be equitable as compared 
to an actual increase of 100 percent which was made by the 
trial court as to each child. 
The trial court also determined that the living 
expenses of Marsha and Mary have "substantially increased 
since the Decree of Divorce" (R. 114). Plaintiff has no 
dispute with this finding, but observes that his living 
expenses have also increased substantially. These expenses 
were never offered by plaintiff, al though he could have done 
so. 
The Order of the trial court as to Mary Kiesel was 
excessive. There was no evidence presented by defendant 
as to the monthly amount required to sustain Mary as compared 
with the amount required back in 1974. Rather, defendant 
testified as to specific items of clothing which were purchased 
for Mary and compared these i terns with what they would have cost 
back in 1974. (R. 150-153.) Items such as shoes, a school 
jacket, and sewing material could be items which would last 
for many years and could not be computed on a monthly basis. 
-10-
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In addition, the evidence showed that Mary was 
making approximately $100 a month as a waitress not includ-
ing tips, which could have increased this amount substantially, 
as evidenced by the fact that Mary had made $9e00 in tips on 
the night prior to the trials 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based upon his 
negative income, the failure of defendant to show the monthly 
living expenses of Mary, and her present ability to work, that 
an increase to $70 per month would be equitable. 
The Court also abused is discretion with reference to 
Marsha Kiesel. As will be noted infra, it is plaintiff's 
contention that the trial court had no authority to order 
support for Marsha since she was 20 at the time of the hearing 
and was no longer a minor. Irrespective of this argument, 
however, the evidence does not warrant an increase in the 
support paid by plaintiff to defendant for Marsha's benefit. 
There can be no doubt that Marsha has a mental and 
physical handicap which results in her being unable to financially 
support herself. 
This situation is indeed unfortunate. However, even 
if it is assumed that plaintiff must continue to support her 
for the rest of her life, a 100 percent increase in the amount 
is not justified. Defendant testified that she is presently 
receiving $208 from Social Security as a supplement for retarded 
children. This money is presumably based upon the present 
-11-
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$75 amount being paid to defendant by plaintiff for Marsha's 
support. Defendant testified that an increase in support 
by plaintiff would amount to a decrease in the amount of 
payment by the Social Security Administration. (R. 155.) 
While the record is unclear as to the relationship between 
support and Social Security payments, this Court can take 
judicial notice that the Social Security regulations require 
a dollar-for-dollar reduction for any amount received as 
child support. In other words, the award of $75 additional 
support would decrease the Social Security benefits by $75. 
It is obvious that the effect of increasing the award 
to Marsha has no net gain for the benefit of the child. 
Since plaintiff has contributed throughout his life to the 
Social Security fund, and since the fund is especially 
establish to assist retarded.children, it serves no purpose 
to require plaintiff to pay the additional $75 while at the 
same time relieving the Federal Government of this obligation. 
This is especially true considering plaintiff's serious 
financial situation based upon the enormous losses he has 
suffered during the last two years in hi·s trucking operation 
as a result of his accident. 
It should also be borne in mind that defendant is 
receiving $253 from Welfare (R. 153), earns small income 
from the· sale of Avon products, and uses approximately $50 
a month worth of products for herself and her children. 
-12-
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(R. 160.) While it undoubtedly difficult for defendant to 
carry on a full time job because of Marsha's condition, the 
Court's conclusion that defendant is needed in the home to 
take care of Marsha is not justified for part-time work, which 
defendant has never attempted to obtain. In addition, the 
original Divorce Decree specifically found that "defendant 
has earned and is capable of earning sufficient funds for 
her personal support, 0 even though at the time Marsha was a 
special child and required the same type of care. (R. 26.) 
The fact that the needs of the children have increased 
since 1975 does not in itself justify an increase in support· 
without consideration of other factors, including the supple-
mental income which has been derived by defendant in their 
support, together with the ability of Mary to support herself. 
These are always difficult cases but this Court stated the 
following consideration in determining whether modification 
is justified: 
There is no question but what plaintiff cannot 
fully support the children on $100 a month and 
that she needs the $140. That, however, is 
only one of a number of important factors to 
be considered in making an award for their 
support. When one blanket is cut to fit two 
beds it seldom will cover them both. The best 
that the Court can do usually is to make such 
division of the income as seems most reasonable, 
fair and equitable to all concerned under the 
circumstances. This is often done indulging 
the hope that the slack may be made up some 
other way. Gale v. Gale, 258 P.2d 286, 287 
(Utah 1953). 
-13-
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The "slack" in this case has been made up by the 
Social Security Administration, the State Welfare, the 
income of Mary, and the actual and potential income of 
defendant. To now require plaintiff to pay an additional 
$125 a month in view of the obvious financial crisis he 
has encountered is inequitable and unjust, especially 
considering that $75 of that amount is only substituting 
the payment already made by the Social Security Administration. 
Because the trial court improperly considered the 
income of plaintiff's wife, improperly concluded that the 
plaintiff had not suffered actual monetary losses during 
the last two years, and had improperly failed to take in 
account the equities existing between the parties as to 
their abilities and needs, the Order of the trial court 
increasing support should be modified to $70 for the support 
of Mary and $75 for the support of Marsha, assuming that 
any support of Marsha is justified. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER UTAH STATUTORY 
DIVORCE LAW TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR MARSHA PAST 
THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE. 
The trial court found that Marsha was a special child 
due to her inability to care for herself, and that she had 
physical and mental deficiencies which rendered her wholly 
dependent upon the defendant for her daily needs and care, 
and that she was in need of special schooling and medical 
-14-
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treatment. (R. 114.) 
Plaintiff does not dispute this finding. The only 
question is whether plaintiff is legally obligated under the 
Decree of Divorce to continue support of Marsha for the 
rest of her life. 
Plaintiff asserts that regardless of what moral or 
ethical obligation he believes he has as to the care and 
maintenance of Marsha, he is not under a legal obligation 
to continue support of her by the terms of the Divorce 
Decree. 
This same question has been raised before this Court 
in Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). In a three to 
two decision this Court held that §30-3-5, U.C.Aet does not 
limit the term "children" to minor children as defined in 
§15-2-1, U.C.A. Plaintiff respectfully submits that in 
light of decisions subsequent to Dehm and in light of the 
reasoning stated in the dissent, that this decision should 
be overruled. 
There are basically three statutory sections which 
are applicable to the resolution of this question. The 
first is §30-3-5, u.c.A., which states that a court may make 
such orders in relation to the "childrenu as may be equitable, 
and that the court may make subsequent changes for the 
support of the "children." As noted in the Dehm opinion, no 
definition of "children" is provided in the divorce code. 
-15-
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------ -~~-~ 
The second applicable section in 15-2-1, U.C.A., 
(Supp. 1953), which states the following: 
The period of minority extends in males and 
females to the age of 18 years; but all 
minors obtain their majority by marriage. 
It is further provided that Courts in 
divorce actions may order support to age 
21. 
The third applicable law is known as the ''Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act" contained in Chapter 45 
of Title 78. This Act provides that every man shall support 
his child and wife and that every woman shall support her 
child and husband. The amended version of §78-45-2 defines 
"child" as a son or daughter under the age of 18 years and 
a son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated 
from earning a living and without sufficient means. 
Plaintiff submits that §30-3-5 must be read solely 
in conjunction with §15-2-1 in that the Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act has no application to divorce 
actions. The reasoning behind this argument is as follows. 
First, since the divorce statute, §30-3-5, provides 
no definition of "children" it is necessary for the courts 
to determine when the obligation for child support ceases. 
Historically, this Court has equated "children" with the 
definition of "minor" children provided for in §15-2-1. 
The original statute passed in 1898 and recodified in the 
1953 Code, stated that a male was a minor until 21 years of 
-16-
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age and a female until 18 years of age. In the context of 
a divorce action, the United States Supreme Court held that 
§15-2-1 was unconstitutional in that two separate ages were 
established for males and females with no justifiable reason 
for such classification. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 
(1975). This Court in three separate decisions finally con-
cluded that in the context of a divorce decree the period of 
minority extended to 18 for both sexes. See 517 P.2d 1010 
(Utah 1974); 552 P.2d 112 (Utah 1976); and 564 P.2d 303 (Utah 
1977). In each case decided by this Court and the United States 
Supreme Court, all references as to the meaning of the divorce 
decree were to §15-2-1. No reference was ever made in any of 
these decisions to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act. 
It is obvious that §15-2-1 is the controlling definition 
of §30-3-5 since the original definition contained in §78-45-2 
would not have been offensive to the equal protection clause 
of the United States Constitution, and would not have resulted 
in review by the United States Supreme Court. §78-45-2 as 
passed in 1957 defined "child" as a son or daughter under the 
age of 21 years, as well as a son or daughter who is incompaci-
tated from earning a living and without sufficient means. 
Obviously, this Section adopted a uniform age for both sexes 
and had it been applicable to a divorce context, the Stanton 
cases would not have resulted. 
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The dissent in Dehm written by Justice Tuckett notes 
this relationship between the divorce code and the definition 
of minors contained in §15-2-1. The dissent specifically 
notes that the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act provides 
a separate cause of action for the enforcement of the duty of 
support by parents, but that there is no provision made which 
would permit enforcement under the divorce laws. The dissent 
concludes by stating: 
It is further noted that the Uniform Support 
Act designates who may become parties and 
those designated are not necessarily a 
husband and wife. I do not think the Court 
should commingle the provisions of that 
Act with Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, which 
deals with the support of minor children in 
a divorce proceeding. 545 P.2d 529-530. 
Regardless of any liability plaintiff may have under 
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the trial court 
did not have authority to order perpetual support for Marsha 
under the terms of the Divorce Decree pursuant to the statutory 
authority granted by §30-3-5. Rather, §15-2-1 only allows the 
Court to order support to age 21 upon a special finding of 
unusual circumstances to justify such extension. Harris v. 
Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah 1978). Had the Legislature wished 
to extend support in divorces for children who are incaoaci tated, 
~ I 
it could have done so by either defining children as such with~: 
Title 30 of the Divorce Code, or by amending §15-2-1 to include 
such children. As a result, this Court can only enforce 
support for Marsha under statutory authority which would 
clearly terminate at age 21 regardless of Mar~ha's physical 
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or mental capacity. 
Plaintiff, therefore, submits that the Stanton decisions 
clearly establish the relationship of the Divorce Code with the 
minority definition and that the dissent in the Dehm case was 
correct in its analysis, and therefore that the Dehm case should 
be overruled and that the Order requiring support of Marsha 
past 21 years of age must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trial court has considerable discretion 
in its decisions concerning modification, this discretion is 
not unlimited. The Court does not have discretion to include 
irrelevant evidence as to the income of plaintiff's wife in 
computing his income. The Court does not have discretion to 
erroneously conclude that depreciation will offset a loss when 
in fact it can only offset a gain. The Court does not have 
discretion to ignore the economic realities of the situation 
where plaintiff's increased payments as to Marsha will only 
substitute for the money which defendant is presently receiv-
ing from Social Security of which plaintiff has contributed 
from his lifetime wages. 
While the trial court followed the existing law as 
to support for retarded children, the Dehm case must be over-
ruled in light of the clear relationship estaplished between 
§30-3-5 and §15-2-1, U.C.A., as established by the subsequent 
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Stanton decisions. 
For these reasons, therefore, the award of support 
for Mary should be modified and the award of support to 
Marsha should be vacatede 
Respectfully submitted, 
KAY M. LEWIS 
1&~2>-~ CIG~COOK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellanl 
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